WATER MARKETING AND THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION
Richard W. Wahl*
Seeking greater efficiency of water use
has become one of the hallmarks of current
discussions of water supply management. In
most urban areas, public utilities either initiate
or are drawn into discussions of water
conservation, system optimization, and
efficient pricing. In terms of water supplied by
the Bureau of Reclamation, the federal agency
charged with building major federal water
supply facilities in the 17 western states, the
potential for such measures has only begun to
be explored, although it was emphasized at
least as far back as the report of the National
Water Commission in 1973 (U.S. National
Water Commission, 1973). The subject is
likely to receive increasing attention simply
because of the vast federal resources already
in place. The Bureau of Reclamation controls
major storage and conveyance facilities in the
western states, which in 1986 supplied more
than 30 million acre-feet of water--27 million
acre-feet for irrigation, 3 million acre-feet for
municipal and industrial uses, and another
million acre-feet for additional uses, as well as
providing hydropower production, recreational
opportunities, and flood control. To the extent
that
conservation
can
be
achieved
inexpensively, existing Bureau of Reclamation
supplies represent a tremendous resource—
both in terms of salvaging unused return flows
and in reallocating water to uses with higher
economic returns. For example, the Imperial
Irrigation District (IID) in southern California
diverts up to 3 million acre-feet annually from
the Colorado River, more than 20% of the
total net diversions from the river. Conserving
15% of this water would yield 450,000 acrefeet--an amount equal to the projected growth
in demand

to the year 2000 of the Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California (MWD), which
serves 27 member agencies on the Southern
California coastal plain.
In fact, two recent agreements between
the MWD and the Imperial Irrigation District
present a dramatic example of these
conservation possibilities. In late 1988 MWD
struck an agreement with IID to fund
conservation measures that would salvage
100,000 acre-feet of water annually for
municipal and industrial uses in the MWD
service area. Under the agreement, MWD will
pay IID $92 million for the construction of
conservation facilities, $3.1 million annually
for operation and maintenance, and $23
million in five annual installments for indirect
costs. Under a separate arrangement, concrete
lining of the All-American Canal (which
carries water from the Colorado River to IID)
will conserve another 70,000 acre-feet of
water for use by MWD. Studies by the Bureau
of Reclamation and the State of California
estimate that there are up to another 250,000
acre-feet of water conservation investments in
the Imperial district that could serve as the
basis for future agreements (see Wahi and
Davis, 1986). Agreements of this type,
involving water already under contract, have
come to be called “voluntary water transfers”
or “water marketing.” Voluntary water
transfers can be either short-term leases,
annual rentals, long-term leases, dry-year
option agreements, or permanent sales.
There are several reasons to believe that
water transfer agreements, along with
improved
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system optimization, are likely to become the
principal vehicles for improvements in the
efficiency of use of federally supplied water,
rather than pricing or mandatory conservation
measures. . The roots are historical. When the
Bureau of Reclamation was established in 1902,
its primary goal was a social one--the settlement
of the arid west with small family farms,
originally limited to 160-acre ownerships.
Repayment to recover costs was secondary, as
reflected by the fact that repayment for irrigation
investment was interest-free over 10 years. When
many of the original projects ran into additional
difficulty (such as poor soils or inadequate
drainage) or encountered problems with
repayment, the federal response was to increase
expenditure to solve the problems, combined
with easing the repayment terms. Eventually this
lead to legislation authorizing interest-free
payment over 50 years for irrigation, further
reduced in some cases to the growers “ability to
pay.” This means that, on average, irrigation
districts repay only about 15% of the cost of the
irrigation investments on a present-worth basis.
Furthermore, these financial terms are written
into long-term Bureau contracts with water users
and are not subject to much change or
adjustment.

adjustable rates to thousands of final consumers,
means that re-marketing of supplies between
these districts is a much more viable possibility
than resales between customers of the average
public utility. Transfer between Reclamation
districts or to other districts would be analogous
to transactions among public utilities. (Similar
transfers have been discussed among the water
districts served by California’s State Water
Project.)
Mandatory conservation measures have
been incorporated into building codes in urban
areas. However, similar measures have not taken
hold on irrigated lands served by the Bureau of
Reclamation, even though districts are required
by 1982 legislation to submit conservation plans
to the Bureau. This is probably due to several
factors, including the low price of water, the lack
of specific standards and enforcement measures
on the part of the Bureau, and the inability of
farmers to finance more expensive conservation
measures. The IID to MWD transfers illustrate
that financing of conservation measures by
parties outside an irrigation district can overcome
all of these obstacles.
There have, in fact, been a number of
transfers involving Reclamation water users in
the past (for additional detail, see Wahi and
Osterhoudt, 1986). Water rentals in the system of
federal storage reservoirs on the Upper Snake
River in Idaho stretch back to the 1930s and were
explicitly recognized in the Bureau of
Reclamation’s contracts with water users. In
1980, the Idaho legislature gave further backing
to such arrangements by authorizing the state to
operate water banks. In 1972, the Utah Power and
Light Company obtained 6,000 acre-feet of water
from two irrigation companies in the federal
Emery County project for power plant cooling.
The City of Casper, Wyoming, is paying the
nearby Casper-Alcova Irrigation District for
canal lining on portions of the district’s fiftynine-mile canal and 190-mile lateral system in
order to reduce seepage. The exchange is
intended to provide the city with 7,000 acre-feet
of water. During the 1976-77 drought in
California, the

Therefore, the Bureau’s water pricing
differs substantially from that of a publicutility.
Utilities base their water prices on the cost of
investment, plus a rate of return and, after
approval by a regulatory commission, rates
change periodically. One other difference is that
the Bureau is a water wholesaler that contracts
with water districts, rather than final consumers
(household or farms). Of course, districts could
price water more efficiently to their consumers,
but in the absence of state regulation of those
districts, the forces against this are considerable
because the charges for water to Bureau districts
is low. Therefore, the avenue of pricing reform
for federal water at the level of federal
contracting is virtually closed in most instances.
On the other hand, the fact that the Bureau has
long-term contracts for large blocks of water with
a relatively small number of districts, rather than
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(5) In September, 1987, the Bureau of
Reclamation issued a report entitled Assessment
'87 which indicated that

Bureau of Reclamation operated a water bank in
which some 45,000 acre-feet of water changed
hands for total payments of $2.2 million. In the
Ft. Collins area, there is a highly organized
market operating in the Northern Colorado
Water Conservancy District, in which water
from the Colorado Big Thompson Project is
exchanged at market value. Share prices for
permanent rights to Colorado-Big Thompson
water (expressed in 1980 dollars) rose from $99
per acre-foot in 1961 to over $2800 per acre-foot
in 1980, although prices have declined
considerably since that time.

The Bureau’s primary role as the developer of large
federally financed agricultural projects is drawing to
a close.... The Bureau of Reclamation must change
from an agency based on federally supported
construction to one based on resource management.

The report goes on to discuss some ways in
which the Bureau could facilitate more efficient
resource management, including developing a
water marketing policy to allow contractors to
sublease water at a profit. The report also
highlights improved systems analysis of multireservoir systems to enhance their dependable
yield, nonfederal operation of Bureau facilities,
transfer of title of facilities to water districts, and
increased roles in the areas of groundwater
management and water quality.

There is reason to believe that the number
of transfer requests will increase in the future.
(1) Water rights on Bureau of Reclamation
projects are obtained under state law, and over
the past decade many western states have
modified their water codes to facilitate transfers
of water (Idaho in 1981, California in 1982,
Oregon in 1987), and similar legislation has
been introduced in other states, such as
Washington in 1987 and 1988.

(6) In December, 1988, the Department of the
Interior responded to the July, 1987 WGA report
by issuing a set of principles designed to guide
Bureau of Reclamation review and approval of
water transfer requests. Under these principles
the Bureau is directed to facilitate transfer
proposals brought to it by interested water users,
provided the transfer complies with state law
and injures no third parties. Most important, the
Department policy will allow districts to profit
from transfers, once federal costs are paid. This
latter provision results from a recommendation
contained in the WGA’s report that it was
necessary to have an economic incentive to
facilitate transfers of federally supplied water.
For those transfers from agricultural to
municipal and industrial use, the Bureau of
Reclamation would also receive increased
revenues since municipal and industrial use
carries interest charges under Reclamation law,
but irrigation use does not. The Department’s
water transfer principles are designed to
standardize Bureau of Reclamation policy from
one project and region to another. For example,
in the Central Valley Project in California,
increased income to a district reassigning its

(2) Accompanying these changes in state law
and because of increasing competition for water,
there has been a growing number of water
transfers in the western states (for a discussion
of dozens of transfers in the southwestern states,
see Saliba and Bush, 1987, or the Water Market
Update newsletter published by Shupe and
Associates, in Santa Fe, New Mexico).
(3) In 1986 and 1987, the Western Governors’
Association (WGA) focused attention on water
efficiency and issued reports suggesting further
changes in both state and federal law and policy
to facilitate transfers (Western Governors’
Association, 1986 and 1987).
(4) Concern over reducing the federal budget
deficit has limited federal financing for
constructing new projects. Requirements for
higher levels of nonfederal cost-sharing for new
projects began focusing more attention on better
allocation and use of existing supplies.
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contractual deliveries had previously been
prohibited as a matter of policy, although it is
not a provision of Reclamation contracts or
Reclamation law. In the Central Arizona
Project, profit on transfers between districts
had been virtually ruled out by the contracts
themselves (for additional background on this
policy, as well as other contractual and
legislative reforms that could further facilitate
transfer of federally supplied water, see Wahi,
1987 and 1989, and Western Governors’
Association, 1987).

states, purchases of or donations of water
for instream uses may come to be one vehicle
for supplementing instream flows, government
regulation and protection of instream flows is.
likely to call for evaluations of water for these
purposes as well.
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